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REFUGEES UNDER UNITED STATES
IMMIGRATION LAW
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE RECENT INFLUX INTO THE UNITED STATES OF APPROXIMATELY
130,0001 South Vietnamese refugees makes appropriate an exami-
nation of the legal aspects of refugee immigration. Even under more
tranquil circumstances many refugees from different areas of the world
come to this country every year. 2 The process of entry into the United
States and the refugees' subsequent status is determined by the provi-
sions of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, as subsequently
amended.3 This note will examine those sections of tl e Act which allow
an alien, based upon his refugee status to come to or to remain in the
United States and acquire permanent residence. 4
The term refugee has been generically applied to persons who flee
or are uprooted from their homes for a variety of reasons. More nar-
rowly, those who leave because of persecution or threatened persecution
on account of race, religion or political opinion have been defined as po-
litical refugees as distinguished from those displaced by natural or man-
made calamity. 5 While the latter type of refugee has received some rec-
ognition in United States immigration law, 6 it has been primarily for the
N.Y. Times, Apr. 23, 1975, at 1, col. 6 (city ed.). As of May 9, 1975, "approximately
113,850 refugees from Indochina" were "under American protection" including those
already in the continental United States, at restaging areas in the Pacific, and still
aboard vessels. H.R. REP. No. 197, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1975).
2 During 1974, 11,577 Cubans were paroled into the United States and 9,391 other
refugees were granted a conditional entry. The meaning of these terms will be ex-
plained later. 1974 IMMIGRATION AND NATURAIUZATION SEnV. ANN. REP. 4, 9 [herein-
after cited as INS ANN. REP.].
3 Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq. (1970) [hereinafter
cited as the Act] [subsequent references will he cited to section numbers of the Act, e.g.,
"Sec. 203(a)(7)"].
Discussion of other provisions affecting refugees, but which do not directly lead to
attainment of immigrant status will be avoided unless they aid analysis. For example,
certain exchange students and visitors are ineligible for an immigrant visa unless they
return to their own countries for at least two years after completing the program for
which they came to the United States. This requirement may be waived, however,
for an alien who cannot return to his country "because he would be subject to persecu-
tion on account of race, religion, or political opinion. . . . Sec. 212(e), 8 U.S.C. §
1182(e) (1970). Under Sec. 243(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1970), deportation may be
withheld if the Attorney General makes the same determination. Neither of these
provisions is the sole basis for a grant of immigrant status.
5 Evans, The Political Refugee in United States Immigration Law and Practice, 3 INT'L
LAw. 204 (1969).
1 Sec. 203(a)(7)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(7)(B) (1970) provides an immigration preference
to "persons uprooted by catastrophic natural calamity as defined by the President."
In the only reported case arising under this provision it was held that requisite to
implementation of this provision is a presidential finding of such a calamity. To date
no President has done so. See Matter of Pasarikovski, 12 Administrative Decisions
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benefit of the political refugee that past and present statutes have been
enacted and administered. It is this type of refugee that will be the focus
of this discussion.
Though an emergency such as the present one focuses attention on
the refugee, this type of immigrant has had a long tradition in Ameri-
can history.7 Although persons who left their countries solely for political
or religious reasons represented only a minority of those aliens who came
here during the era of free immigration, the economic and personal mo-
tives of the others were, nonetheless, often inseparably intertwined with
the political and social conditions existent in their homelands.
When the United States was able to accommodate vast numbers of
aliens, it was unnecessary to draw distinctions between political refugees
and other immigrants; quantitative restrictions, however, eventually be-
came necessary, compelling consideration of the motives of the entrants.
Earlier prohibitions against those who had been convicted of a crime were
not applicable if the conviction was for a political offense.8  Addition-
ally, a special exception to the literacy requirement was made for those
who could show they were fleeing from religious persecution.9  Aside
from these two departures from general restrictions, the political refugee
had to gain admission to the United States within the same framework
as other immigrants. Beginning in 1945,'0 however, through a succession
of congressional and executive actions, the refugee was elevated to a
preferred position under the immigration laws of the United States.
Since 1948 Congress has enacted a series of special measures" per-
taining to refugees outside the framework of general immigration laws.
At the present time, this method of immigration control has fallen into
desuetude, but it may be resorted to in the future at the discretion of
Congress. In 1965 this ad hoc approach was abandoned by enactment
of section 203(a)(7) as part of an extensive amendment to the Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act.12 Although the enactment of this provision did
not effect a major change in refugee immigration policy or procedure, 13
Under the Immigration and Nationality Laws of the United States 526 (1967) [herein-
after cited as I. & N. Dec.].
7 Evans, supra note 5, at 204.
8 Sec. 212(a)(9), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9) (1970).
9 Sec. 212(b)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(b)(2) (1970). For a history of these exemptions and
how they were interpreted, see Evans, supra note 5, at 207-08.
10 A Presidential Directive of Dec. 22, 1945 had liberalized the issuance of immigrant
visas to refugees within the framework of the existing law. See Evans, supra note 5,
at 211-12.
"1 Act of July 14, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-648, 74 Stat. 504 (often called the "Fair Share"
Act); Act of Sept. 22, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-363, 73 Stat. 644 (repealed 1961); Act of
Sept. 2, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-891, 72 Stat. 1712; Act of Sept. 11, 1957, Pub. L. No.
85-316, 71 Stat. 639; Refugee Relief Act of 1953, ch. 336, 67 Stat. 400; Displaced
Persons Act of 1948, ch. 647, 62 Stat. 1009.
12 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(7) (1970); for a discussion of Sec. 203(a)(7) see Evans, supra note
5, at 221-25, and Evans, Political Refugees and the United States Immigration Laws,
62 AM. J. INT'L L. 921, 921-24 (1968).
13 The immediate predecessor of Sec. 203(a)(7) was the "Fair Share" Act, 74 Stat. 504
(1960). That statute incorporated the definition of "refugee-escapee" which had been
1975]
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it signified a continuing commitment to accepting refugees as immigrants
within the permanent framework of general immigration law. An alter-
native method of refugee immigration has developed through Executive
initiative persuant to section 212(d)(5) of the Act,' 4 and it is currently
being administered in conjunction with section 203(a)(7).
II. THE STATUTORY BASIS OF REFUGEE IMMIGRATION
A. Conditional Entry and Adjustment of Status
Under Section 203(a)(7)
Eligibility for refugee status requires the alien to prove that he de-
parted from a Communist or Communist-dominated country or area or
from a country within "the general area of the Middle East."'
5 It must
be shown that his departure constituted a flight, that such a flight was
caused by persecution or fear of persecution on account of race, religion
or political opinion, and that he is unable or unwilling to return." In ad-
dition to the above statutory requirements, the alien must also prove that
he has not permanently resettled in another country in the interval between
his flight and application for classification as a refugee.
Aliens meeting these requirements are granted seventh preference
within the annual Eastern Hemisphere immigration quota of 170,000.17
Within that annual quota, however, they are limited to only 6% of the
total or 10,200. Despite this preferential treatment, the issuance of per-
mits to come to the United States is subject to general availability of
immigrant visas.' 8 A refugee who meets the criteria may apply for a con-
ditional entry in certain specified countries, 9 but the issuance of a condi-
tional entry permit does not constitute an admission as defined in im-
formulated in the Act of Sept. 11, 1957, and which is substantially similar to the one now
found in Sec. 203(a)(7). Also, the procedure that was used in applying for immigration
from abroad under the "Fair Share" Act is similar to the one now in use under Sec.
203(a)(7). See Bowser, The Refugee-Escapee Parole Program, 9 I. & N. REP. 49 (1961).
14 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) (1970).
15 This area is defined as being "the area between and including (1) Libya on the west,
(2) Turkey on the north, (3) Pakistan on the east, and (4) Saudi Arabia and Ethiopia on
the south." Sec. 203(a)(7), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(7) (1970).
16 Sec. 203(a)(7), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(7) (1970).
17 The 1965 amendment to the Act divided Eastern Hemisphere immigrants into preference
and non-preference categories. The first six preferences are based on relationships to
United States citizens and resident aliens, or on occupational skills. Any immigrant
visas not used by preference immigrants are allocated to those who do not qualify for any
of the preferences. Sec. 203(a)(1)-(7), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(1)-(7) (1970). Nothing pre-
cludes a refugee from obtaining a higher perference if he is qualified. IMMIGRATION AND
NATURAUIZATION SERVICE OPERATIONS INSTRUCriON 235.12(a) (Feb. 5, 1975) [herein-
after cited as 01].
18 01 235.12(c) (Feb. 5, 1975).
11 Although Sec. 203(a)(7) only requires that an application be made in a "non-Commu-
nist or non-Communist-dominated country," through regulation this has been further
limited to Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Italy, and Lebanon.
The applicant must be physically present in one of the designated countries and may
not be a national of the country in which the application is made. 8 C.F.R. §
235.9(a) (1974).
[V1ol. 24:528
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migration law.2" After two years in the United States, the conditional
entrant may apply for admission, at which time he is inspected and pos-
sibly granted an adjustment of status to that of a permanent resident.21
It is important to note that during the two year interval between his ar-
rival and formal admission, the conditional entrant is regarded under the
law as not being within the United States, but rather as if he had been
stopped at the border.
An alternative method of attaining immigrant status is reserved for
those aliens who have already been admitted to the United States as non-
immigrants and have been physically present here for two years.2 2 Un-
der a proviso to section 203(a)(7), they may apply for classification as a
refugee. If they meet the same requirements as the conditional entrant,
they may adjust their status to that of permanent residents.23  Such
adjustments are limited to one-half the total number allocated to refugees
under section 203(a)(7). Although the number of aliens who make use of
this proviso is small compared with the number of conditional entrants,
virtually all reported cases arising under 203 (a)( 7 ) originate with mem-
bers of this group.24
B. Parole Under Section 212(d)(5)
Although section 212(d)(5) does not authorize the immigration of
refugees 25 and its use for this purpose was not contemplated by the
20 An admission has been defined as "the freeing of an alien from the legal restraints to
which the immigration laws subject him." Matter of V-Q-, 9 I. & N. Dec. 78, 79 (1960).
It is clear that a conditional entry does not constitute such an admission, since after two
years in the United States the alien must "forthwith return or be returned to the custody"
of the Immigration and Naturalization Service for inspection and examination for ad-
mission. Sec. 203(g), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(g) (1970).
21 See. 203(g), (h), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(g), (h) (1970).
22 The statute requires continuous physical presence, but it need not be immediately
preceding the application for an adjustment of status. An applicant who had been in
the United States for over three years and had briefly left the country and returned was
found to be eligible. Matter of Kozielczk, 11 1. & N. Dec. 785 (1966). The two year
period, however, cannot have been meaningfully interrupted. An innocent, casual, and
brief absence from the United States does not constitute such a meaningful interrup-
tion. See Matter of Kukla, Interim Decision # 2284 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
I.D.] (adopting the test laid down by the Supreme Court in Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374
U.S. 449 (1963)).
23 Sec. 245, 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (1970) [hereinafter referred to as the proviso], excludes
crewmen and natives of the Western Hemisphere from eligibility. An alien must have
been legally admitted or paroled into the United States; those who entered illegally are
ineligible for an adjustment of status. See Matter of Tom, 11 I. & N. Dec. 798 (1966)
(alien originally admitted on a false claim of United States citizenship found to be in-
eligible for the benefits of Sec. 245).
2 In 1974 there were only 793 adjustments of status under the proviso to Sec. 203(a)(7)
as compared with 9,391 conditional entries. 1974 INS ANN. REP. 3, 9.
2 Sec. 212(d)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) (1970), provides in part:
The Attorney General may in his discretion parole into the United States tem-
porarily under such conditions as he may prescribe for emergent reasons or for
reasons deemed strictly in the public interest any alien applying for admission
to the United States, but such parole of such alien shall not be regarded as an
admission of the alien . . ..
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authors of the Act,26 it has come to occupy a very important role in
refugee immigration. Parole has a long history as an administrative de-
vice and was recognized by the courts even prior to enactment of the
section in 1952.27 Parole may be granted for a wide variety of reasons
to aliens who otherwise would not be admitted as either non-immigrants
or immigrants and it has been used in lieu of detention, pending a deter-
mination under section 203(a)(7). 28  A paroled alien's physical presence
in the United States does not constitute an entry or an admission;29
consequently, such an alien remains excludable rather than deportable.
Unlike section 203(a)(7), this section does not prescribe any eligibility
requirements. Rather, the imposition of conditions is left to the discre-
tion of the Attorney General, who has delegated that authority to District
Directors30 of the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Refugees
seeking asylum may be granted parole on an individual basis31 or within
large classes under such conditions as the Government may choose to
prescribe.
Even though there had been prior isolated instances in which immi-
gration authorities had utilized a procedure similar to parole in dealing
with refugees,32 large scale implementation did not occur until the after-
math of the Hungarian revolt in 1956. The law then in effect did not
permit a large number of Hungarians to be admitted to the United States.
Consequently, the Executive branch invoked section 212(d)(5) admitting
2 At the hearings on H.R.J. Res. 397 which was subsequently enacted as Pub. L. No.
86-648, 74 Stat. 504 (1960) (the "Fair Share" Act) and which authorized the parole of
refugees into the United States, Representative Feighan stated that the drafters had
visualized its use solely for emergencies such as a ship disaster at sea and that it was
believed that at any one time no more than 4,000 persons would be permitted to enter
the United States pursuant to this provision. Hearings on H.J. Res. 397 before Sub-
comm. No. 1 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 45 (1960)
[hereinafter cited as 1960 Hearings].
27 For a discussion of the background of Sec. 212(d)(5) and cases wvhich arose before its
enactment, see 27 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 373 (1959).
28 C. Goaoo,4 & H. ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PrOCEDURE § 2.54 (rev. ed.
1974).
29 To constitute an entry there must be physical presence on United States territory plus
an inspection and admission, or an actual and intentional evasion of inspection coupled
with freedom from restraint. Matter of Pierre, I.D. # 2238 (1973) (citing numerous
cases). Since parole by the very terms of the statute does not constitute an admission
and is regarded as a form of legal restraint, it is not an entry into the United States.
30 8 C.F.R. 212.5(a) (1975). This authority has been subdelegated to officers or inspectors
in charge of a port of entry with careful limitations on its exercise. 01 212.5(a)
(July 26, 1972).
31 01 212.5(b) (July 26, 1972). The procedure for granting asylum is set out in 01 108.1
(b), (c) (Dec. 18, 1974).
32 In 1940 a group of European refugees who had been refused entry to Mexico were
permitted to come ashore in the United States, even though most of them could not
qualify for either immigrant or non-immigrant visas under the stringent law at that
time. A group of refugees from Italy was brought to the United States in 1944 and
kept in semi-confinement at a camp near Oswego, New York, without ever having been
formally admitted to this country. They were later permitted to go to Canada to obtain
United States immigrant visas which became available as a result of the Presidential
Directive of Dec. 22, 1945. For a discussion of these early episodes, see L. WIrTE,
300,000 NEW AMERICANS 61-71 (1957).
[Vol. 24:528
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the Hungarians as parolees notwithstanding the unavailability of immi-
grant visas. 33  This situation is illustrative of the parole provision's
flexibility3 4 and usefulness in meeting emergency situations, however, it
also demonstrates the shortcomings inherent in its use for large scale
immigration. Unlike earlier refugees who had come as quota or non-
quota immigrants, 35 the Hungarian parolees were not considered to
have been admitted to the United States and as section 245 was inter-
preted, they would have been unable to adjust their status to permanent
33 The Refugee Relief Act of 1953 was then due to expire; 6,130 non-quota immigrant
visas which had been authorized by that measure, but which had gone unused, were
issued to Hungarian refugees. Swing, Hungarian Escapee Program, 6 1. & N. REP.
43 (1958). The legal status of those who had obtained immigrant visas and were
formally admitted to the United States was totally different from that of the other
Hungarians who arrived as parolees. This episode introduced an aberration into
refugee immigration policy which persists to this day - people who leave the same
country at the same time for the same reasons may come to occupy different legal
postures depending upon which provision of the law is used to bring them to the United
States.
Unavailability of visas has been the chief reason for using parole but given the
broad scope of the arole authority, there is nothing to prevent its use to allow into the
United States aliens who are inadmissible for other reasons. Since refugees are
paroled with the expectation that they will eventually become permanent residents, it
is highly unlikely, however, that serious grounds for inadmissibility would be bypassed
in this manner. The grounds for inadmissibility which have been waived in the case
of the South Vietnamese parolees are the lack of a labor certification under Sec. 212(a)
(14), the likelihood of becoming a public charge under Sec. 212(a)(15), and the
documentary requirements of Sec. 212(a)( 2 0); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(14), (15), (20) (1970).
H.R. REP. No. 197, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1975).
14 The broad eligibility requirements for the Hungarians consisted of flight from Hungary
after October 23, 1956 and qualification under the regular provisions of the immigra-
tion law. The parole program was initially limited to those refugees who were in
Austria, but in 1957 it was extended to those who had fled to Yugoslavia or had gone
from Austria to "countries of second asylum." From among those meeting the general
requirements, certain refugees were granted parole based on subjective criteria.
Swing, supra note 33, at 43-44.
The granting of parole to Chinese refugees in Hong Kong in 1962 was, in contrast,
far more restrictive. Eligibility was limited to relatives of United States citizens and
resident aliens, those with special skills, and those who had applied for admission under
former refugee laws and had not been accepted due only to numerical limitations.
Matter of Chai, 12 1. & N. Dec. 81, 82 (1967), citing Annual Report of the Attorney
General for 1964.
Parole of Cuban refugees, however, appears to be without regard to specific
numerical restrictions or eligibility requirements. This was a direct result of severance
of diplomatic relations in 1961, precluding the issuance of immigrant or non-immigrant
visas. Woytych, The Cuban Refugee, 16 I. & N. REP. 15 (1967). In 1965, agreement
with the Cuban government established a refugee airlift which functioned until 1973;
tlhe United States undertook to accept all Cubans who wished to live here, after those
who had relatives in this country were removed. Memorandum of Understanding with
Cuba Concerning Movement to the United States of Cubans Wishing to Live in the
United States, Nov. 6, 1965, para. 8 [1966] 17 U.S.T., T.I.A.S. No. 6063. Since that
time parole has also been granted to Cubans living in third countries who wish to join
relatives in the United States. 1974 INS ANN. REP. 3.
31 Under the Displaced Persons Act of 1948, the immigrant visas granted to those who
were eligible were deducted from future quotas allocated to the recipients' country of
nationality under the national origin system then in effect. Displaced Persons Act of
1946, § 3(b), 62 Stat. 1010. These quota deductions were expunged by the Act of
Sept. 11, 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-316, 71 Stat. 639. Beginning with the Refugee Relief
Act of 1953, immigrant visas were not deducted from the recipients' national quotas.
1975]
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residents no matter how long they remained in the United States.36
The presence of large numbers of parolees who had every expectation
of being allowed to remain permanently in the United States raised trouble-
some questions concerning how their parole could be revoked and how
their status differed from parolees temporarily in this country in accor-
dance with the original purpose of section 212(d)(5).
Despite the shortcomings in this use of parole, Congress in 1960
adopted it as the continuing method of refugee immigration notwithstand-
ing any emergency.A7 This has been highly criticized as not in consonance
with congressional intent,38 and consideration of the 1965 amendments
to the Immigration and Nationality Act rekindled the debate. Congress
intended by enactment of section 203(a)(7) to obviate the necessity for
the aberrant use of section 212(d)(5).3 9 This is evident in the committee
reports which accompanied the bill:
In as much as definite provision has now been made for refugees,
it is the express intent of the committee that the parole provi-
sions of the Immigration and Nationality Act, which remain un-
changed by this bill, be administered in accordance with the
original intention of the drafters of that legislation. The parole
provisions were designed to authorize the Attorney General to
act only in emergent, individual, and isolated situations, such
as the case of an alien who requires immediate medical atten-
tion, and not for the immigration of classes or groups outside of
the limit of the law. 40
It is clear that Congress has failed in its attempt to return parole to its
originally intended function, and it appears that absent a revision of sec-
tion 203(a)(7) or other congressional action, parole will continue to be
used as an alternate and supplementary method of refugee immigration.
At this point it is appropriate to distinguish between the use of parole
as part of legislative enactment and its use by the Executive with con-
3 Prior to its amendment in 1960, Sec. 245(a) required an alien to have been "admitted
to the United States as a bona fide non-immigrant" in order to be eligible for an adjust-
ment of status. 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (1970), historical note, at 280. As parolees, the
Hungarians were ineligible to become permanent residents until permitted to do so
by the Act of July 25, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-559, 72 Stat. 419. A similar problem
occurred with the next large group of parolees, the Cubans, who as Western Hemi-
sphere natives remained ineligible for an adjustment of status even under the amended
version of See. 245. They were permitted to adjust their status by the Act of Nov. 2,
1966, Pub. L. No. 89-732, 80 Stat. 1161.
3' Act of July 14, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-648, 74 Stat. 504.
38 See note 26 supra.
31 It is clear that Congress did not intend any substantive change by substituting the
term "conditional entry" for "parole". "The conditional entry of refugees as proposed
in this bill is not unlike the parole procedure utilized during the existence of the so-called
Fair Share Act (Sec. 212(d)(5)) and it is intended that the procedure remain the same."
Since the term "parole" had connotations unfavorable to the alien, the term "conditional
entry" was used. H.R. REP. No. 745, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1965); S. REP. No.
748, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3335 (1965).
40 S. REP. No. 748, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3335 (1965).
[Vol. 24:528
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gressional acquiescence. An example of the former occurred in 1960
when Congress selected parole as the method of refugee immigration,
manifested today in section 203(a)(7) as conditional entry. In such a case
Congress prescribes the conditions of eligibility and determines the num-
ber of refugees to be accepted, however, beginning with the Hungarians,
the latter use has become increasingly common and is now being em-
ployed to bring South Vietnamese refugees to the United States. In the
present situation in South Vietnam, eligibility appears to have been de-
termined by the individual's relationship to Americans, his connection
with the United States government, or sheer chance. 4' Further illustrat-
ing parole's flexibility is that the number of persons eligible may be in-
creased at the option of the government4 2 and additional conditions or
restrictions on eligibility may be imposed.4 3  The continued use of sec-
tion 212(d)(5) by the executive branch with congressional acquiescence
has been made necessary by the inflexible and restrictive nature of
section 203(a)(7). Parole has been used to accept those refugees who
are ineligible for conditional entry, but whose rescue is in the national in-
terest either for humanitarian or foreign policy reasons.
44
C. The Legal Status of the Parolee and Conditional Entrant
Once the refugee has arrived in the United States as either a condi-
tional entrant under section 203(a)(7) or as a parolee under section
212(d)(5), he occupies an ambiguous position until such time as he adjusts
41 The original plan had been to extend parole to those South Vietnamese who were
relatives of United States citizens and resident aliens and to some 50,000 who were con-
sidered to be in the "high risk" category because of their close association with the United
States Government. Letter from L. F. Chapman, Jr., Commissioner, Immigration and
Naturalization Service, to Peter W. Rodino, Jr., Chairman, House Committee on the
Judiciary, April 22, 1975, reproduced in CONC. REC. H 3123-24 (daily ed. April 22,
1975). Many South Vietnamese belonging to neither category, however, succeeded in
escaping the Communist takeover by their own efforts and parole has also been extended
to this group. H.R. REP. No. 197, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1975).
42 On September 30, 1972, it was decided that 1,000 Ugandan Asians would be paroled
into the United States. This figure was raised by an additional 500 on April 3, 1973.
1973 INS ANN. REP. 5.
13 In December 1972, the Government decided to deny parole to Cubans who had arrived
here from third countries illegally or without proper documentation. Conceiro v.
Marks, 360 F. Supp. 454, 458 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). As an added condition, the South
Vietnamese parolees are required to sign a sworn statement that they have "not
participated in the persecution of any person because of race, religion or political
opinion ... " Any person who fails to sign such a statement will not be eligible for
parole. H.R. REP. No. 197, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1975).
41 A recent example is the extension of parole to 1,500 Asians expelled from Uganda in
1972. Clearly they would have been ineligible under Sec. 203(a)(7) since Uganda is
neither Communist nor within the general area of the Middle East. Additionally,
parole has been employed to bypass numerical restrictions. 1973 INS ANN. REP. 5
(200 Soviet Jews who succeeded in leaving the U.S.S.R.).
In Matter of Harutunian, I.D. # 2263 (1974), the alien was eligible under Sec. 203(a)
(7) but was paroled because conditional entries were not available. Under Sec. 203(h)
the conditional entrant's adjustment of status to permanent resident is retroactive to the
date of arrival in the United States, whereas the parolee's adjustment of status takes
place under Sec. 245 and becomes effective only as of the date of approval. This is
another illustration of the distinction referred to in note 33 supra.
1975]
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his status to that of a permanent resident. The parolee's mere physi-
cal presence on American soil does not constitute an admission or even
an entry into this country.15  When Congress fashioned the designation
"conditional entrant" it was made clear that no change was intended,
and that such an alien would occupy the same status in immigration
law as the parolee.46
Although both types of refugees enjoy some attributes of the resident
alien such as the right to employment47 and subjection to taxation,48
they are denied others. A conditional entrant may not petition for the
admission of his relatives as immigrants on the basis of the same prefer-
ential classification available to relatives of resident aliens. 49  It is also
questionable whether recent decisions extending the rights of resident
aliens have any effect on parolees and conditional entrants.50  Until an
adjustment of status they remain subject to exclusion rather than depor-
tation, and though an exclusion proceeding is not without procedural
safeguards, they are a matter of legislative grace rather than a constitu-
tional right. 51
The grounds for exclusion and deportation are similar,52 but they are
given broader application in exclusion proceedings, thus while identical
grounds may be alleged, the outcome may hinge on which type of pro-
ceeding is involved.-- If a parolee or conditional entrant is found to be
excludable, he may not invoke section 243(h) to have his deportation
45 See note 29 supra.
41 See note 39 supra.
47 An assurance of employment is a prerequisite to obtaining a conditional entry. 8
C.F.R. § 235.9(c) (1975). A similar requirement would appear to be applicable to
those refugees who are paroled in lieu of a conditional entry. The South Vietnamese
parolees will not be released from refugee camps "until a responsible voluntary agency
has furnished assurances of housing and employment or care and support." H.R. REP.
No. 197, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1975).
48 Compare the broad definition of resident for income tax purposes. "An alien actually
present in the United States who is not a mere transient or sojourner is a resident
... " Treas. Reg. § 1.871-2(b) (1960).
41 Matter of Kotur, 12 I. & N. Dec. 609 (1968).
50 See, e.g., Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717
(1973); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971). The parties involved were resi-
dent aliens and the decisions were based on the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. It is uncertain to what extent, if any, parolees and conditional entrants of
the type under discussion are considered to be "within" the United States and entitled to
the protection of the Constitution. For a discussion of these decisions and the status of
the alien generally, see Note, Immigrants, Aliens, and the Constitution, 49 NoTRE DAME
LAW. 1075 (1974).
51 United States ex rel. Stellas v. Esperdy, 366 F.2d 266 (2d Cir. 1966) ("Any procedure
authorized by Congress for the exclusion of aliens is due process.").
52 Compare Sec. 212(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (1970) with Sec. 241(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)
(1970).
53 See Matter of Harutunian, I.D. # 2263 (1974), where a paroled refugee was found to
be excludable under Sec. 212(a)(15) for having become a public charge by receiving
state old age assistance after her arrival in the United States. Becoming a public
charge within five years after entry is also a ground for deportation under Sec. 241(a)(8),
but in a deportation proceeding the term "public charge" is more narrowly construed.
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withheld.54  Though the refugee has had to prove a fear of persecution
to be allowed into the United States, he may not assert the same reason
in order to remain. An anomalous result is thereby created in which an
alien who has entered this country illegally and who is subject to depor-
tation enjoys greater rights than one whose presence has been facilitated
by the United States on a preferential basis.5 Whereas a refugee who
has arrived under section 203(a)(7) is entitled to a hearing before his
conditional entry is terminated, 56 no hearing is required for the revoca-
tion of parole. 57  The absence of such a hearing has been repeatedly
challenged as denial of due process, however, the courts have continued
to hold that the parolee is one who is "outside" the United States and
is not entitled to assert rights under the Constitution.
58
Nevertheless, the courts have granted limited recognition to the fact
that a refugee paroled into the United States enjoys rights superior to
those of aliens whose presence rests on the same legal basis. In 1957
the Government revoked the parole of a Hungarian refugee because he
had misrepresented facts about his membership in the Communist Party.
A subsequent exclusion hearing, however, was limited to the sole issue of
whether or not he had an immigrant visa, the unavailability of which was
the precise reason it had originally been necessary to parole him and thou-
sands of other Hungarians. The absence of such a visa resulted in a
finding that he was excludable. The refugee challenged the order on the
grounds that the revocation of parole without a hearing, and an exclusion
hearing to determine an already obvious fact unrelated with the true rea-
sons for his exclusion, were a denial of due process. The district court
held that since parolees were "outside the full reach of the Fifth Amend-
ment," he was not entitled to a hearing on revocation and the subse-
quent exclusion hearing was upheld.59  The court of appeals, however,
54 In Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185 (1958), the Supreme Court held that a parolee
is not "within" the United States for the purpose of invoking Sec. 243(h) (withholding
deportation at discretion of Attorney General; see note 4 supra). Noted in 27 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 373 (1959). The most recent application of this view is found in Matter
of Pierre, I.D. # 2238 (1973).
M The refugee's presence in this country rests on the same legal basis as that of other
types of parolees and conditional entrants. The term "conditional entrant" is also
sometimes applied to alien crewmen who enter the United States on a conditional
landing permit issued under Sec. 252(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1282(a)(1) (1970). See United
States ex rel. Kordic v. Esperdy, 386 F.2d 232 (2d Cir. 1967). There is an obvious
distinction between an alien allowed into the United States for a limited time and a
limited purpose and one who comes with every reasonable expectation of being per-
mitted to remain permanently and of eventually acquiring citizenship. Yet, in terms of
their legal status both groups appear to be in the same position.
56 8 C.F.R. § 235.9(f) (1975).
57 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(a) (1975) provides: "... when in the opinion of the district director
• ..neither emergency nor public interest warrants the continued presence of the alien
in the United States, parole shall be terminated upon written notice to the alien and he
shall be restored to the status which he had at the time of parole ..... " At that
point if the alien is found to be inadmissible, exclusion proceedings are conducted.
8 "The Fifth Amendment does not affect, in any degree, Congress' plenary power over
exclusion procedures." Wong Hing Fun v. Esperdy, 335 F.2d 656, 657 (2d Cir. 1964).
11 United States ex rel. Paktorovics v. Murff, 156 F. Supp. 813 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
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reversed and held that under the special circumstances of this case, "pa-
role may not be revoked without a hearing at which the basis for the
discretionary ruling of revocation may be contested on the merits."60
The factors distinguishing this alien from other parolees and entitling
him to due process were the circumstances under which he and the other
Hungarian refugees had come to the United States.
What makes this case different from other exclusion cases . . .
is that Paktorovics was invited here pursuant to the announced
foreign policy of the United States as formulated by the Presi-
dent . . . True it is that the President has no power to change
the law by inviting Paktorovics and the other Hungarian refu-
gees to come here, but this is not to say that the tender of such
an invitation and its acceptance by him did not effect a change
in the status of Paktorovics sufficient to entitle him to the protec-
tion of our Constitution.6
Although the decision was limited to whether a hearing was required
prior to revocation of parole, the court seemed to suggest that the stan-
dards of due process should also govern the subsequent exclusion hear-
ing. 62  Presumably, the holding of Paktorovics is equally applicable to
other refugees who have been paroled into the United States since that
time by Executive initiative. It would seem analogous that those who have
come to this country under section 203(a)(7) would also appear to have
been "invited" by virtue of congressional enactment of that provision and
ought to be entitled to due process during hearings to terminate their
conditional entry. If this view were adopted, both groups would be en-
titled to constitutional safeguards during their subsequent exclusion hear-
ings. Although speculative at best, it might also be contended that the
status of "invitee" brings both types of refugees "within" the United
States for the purpose of invoking other rights on the same basis as
those aliens who have been admitted or have entered illegally.M
The crucial factor setting the refugee apart from other parolees and
conditional entrants appears to be whether he has been "invited here
pursuant to the announced foreign policy of the United States. 6 4 In
Ahrens v. Rojas, 6  the alien was a prominent Cuban politician under
10 United States ex rel. Paktorovics v. Murff, 260 F.2d 610, 612 (2d Cir. 1958), noted in
34 NoTRE DAME LAW. 256 (1959); 45 VA. L. REV. 283 (1959); 4 VILL. L, REV. 436 (1959).
61 United States ex rel. Paktorovics v. Murff, 260 F.2d 610, 614 (2d Cir. 1958).
62 Speaking of the Hungarian parolees in general, the court said: "None of them have any
visas and the only hearing to which any of these parolees will be entitled under the
law, as thus interpreted, will be a hearing to determine the already obvious fact that
they have no visas." Id. at 612.
63 For example, the right to invoke Sec. 243(h) to have deportation withheld. In Leng
May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185 (1958), where the Supreme Court held that a parolee
has no such right, the alien had not been paroled into the United States pursuant to
any refugee program. She arrived claiming United States citizenship and was initially
held in custody and then paroled pending a determination of her claim.
64 United States ex rel. Paktorovics v. Murf, 260 F.2d 610, 614 (2d Cir. 1958).
65 292 F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 1961).
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the Batista regime who fled to Florida immediately after the Castro rev-
olution. He was granted parole which was subsequently revoked without
a hearing. Even though he had at least a colorable claim to being con-
sidered a political refugee, his attempt to challenge the revocation of his
parole on the basis of Paktorovics was rebuffed. The court found that
"[t]here are no similar distinctions in the present case,"'6 6 despite the
alien's showing that at that time (1961) thousands of other Cubans
were being paroled into the United States.67  It is apparent that his
parole was granted on an individual basis and that at the time of his ar-
rival on January 1, 1959, no such policy of granting parole en masse to
Cubans existed. 68  This suggests that only those refugees who were
paroled into the United States pursuant to a decision by the Government
invoking section 212(d)(5) on behalf of some group or class may be
considered "invitees" within the meaning of Paktorovics. The alien who
is granted asylum and paroled on an individual basis is apparently entitled
to no greater rights than a non-refugee parolee. 69
Despite the temporary ambiguous legal position which a refugee oc-
cupies after his arrival, the advantages which attach to the status of ref-
ugee under United States immigration law7" lead many aliens to seek
that classification. To ensure that only bona fide political refugees enjoy
these advantages, several requirements have been established administra-
tively and statutorily. While eligibility for parole depends upon whatever
criteria the Executive chooses to establish in a given instance, the require-
ments which an alien must meet under section 203(a)(7) are partially
evinced in the statute itself. They are the same for those seeking con-
ditional entry from abroad and for those already within the United States
who wish to be classified as refugees under the proviso.
III. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF REFUGEE STATUS
UNDER SECTION 203(a)(7)
The requirements for eligibility which are set out in this provision
represent the culmination of an evolutionary process under prior enact-
ments.7 1 The requirement that the refugee establish his origin in Com-
66 Id. at 409.
Id. at 412.
6 Most Cuban refugees came to the United States with either immigrant or non-immigrant
visas until diplomatic relations were severed in 1961. Woytych, The Cuban Refugee,
16 1. & N. REP. 15 (1967).
Non-refugee parolees have repeatedly challenged the revocation of parole without a
hearing on the basis of Paktorovics but without success. See Wong Hing Fun v.
Esperdy, 335 F.2d 657 (2d Cir. 1964); Sui Fung Luk v. Rosenberg, 271 F. Supp. 485
(C.D. Cal. 1967), aff'd, 409 F.2d 555 (9th Cir. 1969); United States ex rel. Stellas v.
Esperdy, 250 F. Supp. 85 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), aff'd, 366 F.2d 266 (2d Cir. 1966); United
States ex rel. Tom We Shung v. Murtf, 176 F. Supp. 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
'0 In addition to a preferential position within the numerical limitations on immigrants,
conditional entrants are not required to obtain a labor certification under Sec. 2 12 (a)(14),
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(14) (1970).
71 For an analysis of some features of the earlier refugee immigration acts and a discussion
of some cases arising under them, see Evans, supra note 5, at 211-19.
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munist territory is easily understood in light of the foreign policy of the
United States,7 2 but the alternative requirement that he be "from any
country within the general area of the Middle East,"7 3 is difficult to ex-
plain. This language originated in the Act of September 11, 1957,1
and has been perpetuated as part of section 203(a)(7). The legislative
history is silent as to why this one area of the world was singled out for
special concern. 75 When the bill was under debate in the House, Repre-
sentative Feighan expressed his bewilderment:
What the Senate bill does is bring forth an absolutely new con-
cept of a definition of a so-called refugee-escapee . . . .They
will come from the general area of the Middle East. That area
is far greater than that encompassed by the Eisenhower doc-
trine. There were never any hearings whatever on this new
definition. We heard no testimony from the Eisenhower ad-
ministration whether the President understands what this new
definition means, whether it is consistent with our national
policy in that critical area of the world and whether it is accept-
able.
7 6
Some remarks made during the congressional debate suggest that the
Middle East area was included to benefit a group of refugees who had
been expelled from Egypt in the wake of the 1956 war and who were
then being aided by the United States.77  If this was indeed the reason, it is
unclear why the area was so broadly defined; nor is it clear why the
same definition has been perpetuated in subsequent legislation, long
72 This requirement can be traced back to the Displaced Persons Act of 1948, ch. 647,
62 Stat. 1009, although the term "Communist" as such was not used in that measure.
In Sec. 2(b), Congress adopted the definition of "refugee" and "displaced person"
which had been formulated by the International Refugee Organization (IRO), and then
in Sec. 2(c) Congress proceeded to limit that definition by adding additional require-
ments. In Sec. 2(d), 62 Stat. 1010, eligibility was extended to "a native of Czecho-
slovakia who has fled as a direct result of persecution or fear of persecution from that
country since January 1, 1948 .... The Communist Party had seized control of that
nation's government in February of that year; furthermore, those persons who fell within
the IRO definition because of their objection to returning to their homelands were mostly
citizens of countries under Communist control. This policy of assisting fugitives from
Communism was manifest in subsequent legislation. See Refugee Relief Act of 1953,
ch. 336, § 2(b), 67 Stat. 400; Act of Sept. 11, 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-316, § 15(c)(1)(A),
71 Stat. 639, 643.
71 Sec. 203(a)(7)(A)(i)(II), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(7)(A)(i)(II) (1970).
74 Act of Sept. 11, 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-316, § 15(c)(1)(B), 71 Stat. 639, 643. The
definition of the "general area of the Middle East" in Sec. 15(c)(2) is identical to the
one now found in Sec. 203(a)(7). See note 15 supra.
75 The House Report omits any discussion of Sec. 15. H.R. REP. No. 1199, 85th Cong.,
1st Sess. 2016 (1957). The Senate Report only expresses the committee's intention
that the distribution of the immigrant visas allocated by Sec. 15 be done in a fair and
equitable manner "according to the showing of hardship, persecution, and the welfare
of the United States." S. REP. No. 1057, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1957).
76 103 CONG. REc. 16302 (1957).
77 Id. at 15497-98, 16303, 16305, 16309. See 37 DEP'T STATE BuLL. 239 for the assistance
which the United States was then providing to these refugees. See also Matter of
Shirinian, 12 I. & N. Dec. 392, 394 (1967), where the applicant unsuccessfully attempted
to invoke these events in support of her claim to refugee status under Sec. 203(a)(7).
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after the problem of the Egyptian refugees has been resolved.7  When
the Middle East clause of the 1957 Act was incorporated by reference
in House Joint Resolution 397 (the so-called "Fair Share Act" of 1960)
and included in section 203(a)(7) in 1965, no inquiry was made into why
it had originally been enacted or what factors, if any, justified its re-
tention. In fact, comments on this provision in the hearings on the 1960
and 1965 measures centered on proposals to extend the definition of the
Middle East area to include the countries of North Africa. 79 Despite its
obscure origin, the requirement that a refugee be from the general area
of the Middle East remains an arbitrary boundary in determining eligibil-
ity under the current statute.
Section 203(a)(7) requires that the alien's departure from one of the
defined areas constitute a flight caused by persecution or fear of persecu-
tion on account of race, religion, or political opinion.80 This language
can also be traced back to the Displaced Persons Act of 1948. While
the definition framed by the International Refugee Organization (IRO),
which was adopted by Congress, did not use those terms, the requirement
that the refugee must fear persecution can be found in that portion of the
definition which limited IRO's mandate to those displaced persons who
expressed valid objections to repatriation.8 ' Among those objections con-
sidered valid were, "[p]ersecution, or fear based on reasonable grounds
of persecution because of race, religion, nationality or political opin-
ions .... ".,2 In other parts of the 1948 Act where Congress chose to
use its own language,8 3 and in later amendments to that Act and sepa-
rate enactments, the term "persecution" has been used repeatedly as a
requirement for establishing refugee status, and it has usually been spec-
ified that such persecution must occur on grounds of race, religion, or
political opinion.8 4
7 A belief that the Middle East was included in the 1957 Act, and retained in subsequent
legislation for the benefit of Palestinian refugees, is not supported by analysis of
United States refugee immigration statistics, although a true picture of Palestinian
immigration is difficult to obtain because of the varying citizenship of these persons in
other Arab countries. 1974 INS ANN. REP. 35, Table 6E. Resettlement of Palestinian
refugees within the United States does not appear to have been an aim of refugee
immigration policy when Sec. 203(a)(7) was enacted. Hearings Before the Subcomm.
to Investigate Problems Connected With Refugees and Escapees of the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 202 (1966).
9 1960 Hearings, supra note 26, at 57. In 1965 the State Department had proposed
that the western boundary of the general area of the Middle East be extended to include
Morocco. Hearings on H.R. 2580 Before Subcomm. No. 1 of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 68 (1965).
50 Sec. 203(a)(7)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(7)(A)(i) (1970).
s IRO CONST. annex I, part I, § C, 1, appearing as "Appendix I" in HOLBORN, THE
INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE ORGANIZATION 585 (1956).
12 Id. § C, Il(a) (i).
'3 Displaced Persons Act of 1948, ch. 647, § 2 (d), 62 Stat. 1010; § 4(b), 62 Stat. 1011;
§ 7, 62 Stat. 1012.
8 Act of Sept. 11, 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-316, § 15(c)(1), 71 Stat. 643; Refugee Relief Act
of 1953, ch. 336, § 2, 64 Stat. 219; § 4, 64 Stat. 223. In 1968 the United States became
a party to the United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, [1968] 5
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The requirement that the alien be unable or unwilling to return to the
area from which he fled was expressed in the 1948 Act in language iden-
tical to that contained in section 203(a)(7). s5  In another part of that Act
and in later legislation, the term "cannot return" was used; whether there
is any significance in this distinction is doubtful. As will be seen, this
requirement is of only marginal importance in determining eligibility un-
der section 203(a)(7).
The last requirement which the alien must meet is that he did not
become permanently resettled in another country in the interval be-
tween his flight and his claim of refugee status. This prerequisite was
clearly stated in earlier statutes,8 6 but was omitted for unexplained rea-
sons from the 1957 Act and was not enacted as a part of section 203(a)(7).
Its absence has generated much litigation; since, however, the Supreme
Court has held that such a requirement is valid,8 7 it is currently being
imposed. The purpose of all these requirements is to limit the number of
aliens who may make use of section 203(a)(7) and to assure that those
who receive its benefits are bona fide political refugees.
A. Place of Origin
Since section 203(a)(7) is applicable only to persons subject to the
Eastern Hemisphere quota, Western Hemisphere natives are automati-
cally excluded from eligibility. 8  Having established general eligibility
U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577. In addition to those refugees who are persecuted on
account of their race, religion, or political opinion, the Protocol recognizes two other
classes: those persecuted on account of "nationality" and "membership of a particular
social group." It has been held in a proceeding under Sec. 243(h) that these two addi-
tional classes "are generically similar to the three which were the concern of Congress
in section 243(h)." Matter of Dunar, I.D. # 2192 (1973). The categories recognized
in Sec. 243(h) are identical to those described in Sec. 203(a)( 7 ) and it would appear that
the adherence of the United States to the Protocol has made no change in the criteria
for eligibility under the latter section. As yet, the only reported case involving the
Protocol and Sec. 203(a)(7) is Matter of Wong Kai Yuk, I.D. # 2249 (1973). The issue
in that case was limited, however, to the Board of Immigration Appeals' jurisdiction to
grant classification as a refugee.
85 Displaced Persons Act of 1948, ch. 647, § 7, 62 Stat. 1012.
56 It last appeared in the Refugee Relief Act of 1953, ch. 336, § 2(a), 67 Stat. 400.
17 Rosenberg v. Yee Chien Woo, 402 U.S. 49 (1971).
8s Western Hemisphere natives are termed "special immigrants" under the current act
(8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27) (1970)) and they are excluded from the allocation of immigrant
visas prescribed in Sec. 203, 8 U.S.C. § 1153 (1970). Cuban refugees born in the
Eastern Hemisphere, however, have been able to utilize this provision. Matter of
Rodriguez, 11 I. & N. Dec. 901 (1966) (native of Spain); Matter of Kozielczk, 11
I. & N. Dec. 785 (1966) (native of Poland); Matter of Drachman, 11 1. & N. Dec. 518
(1966) (native of Poland). This distinction between native born and foreign born
Cubans is not without its advantages to the latter. The availability of immigrant visas
is determined in large part by the number of applicants from the alien's country of
birth. Native Cubans must wait long periods for an immigrant visa to become available
because of the smaller Western Hemisphere immigration ceiling of 120,000 and the
large number of Cubans who are eligible for such visas. Within the Western Hemisphere
quota there are no preference categories. Cubans born in the Eastern Hemisphere,
on the other hand, may face a much shorter waiting period depending on the volume of
immigration from their native countries. Because of their preferential status under
Sec. 203(a)(7), they receive priority over all non-preference applicants. It is doubtful
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under the section, the applicant must then show that he departed from a
country or area which is Communist or Communist-dominated or a coun-
try within the general area of the Middle East as defined in the statute.
That definition is narrowly interpreted, thus, persons from adjoining
countries are excluded from eligibility. s9 The statute does not contain a
definition of what constitutes a Communist country or area, leaving un-
clear what distinction, if any, there is between one that is Communist
and one that is Communist-dominated. 0 Also noticeably absent is a def-
inition of what constitutes such domination or at what point in a nation's
political life it is deemed to occur. 9' Presumably such a determination
is governed by the official position of the State Department.
A person who has fled from a Communist to a non-Communist part
of the same country is eligible for refugee status, even though, strictly
speaking, he has never left the country of his nationality.92 Unless the
applicant succeeds in establishing his origin in one of the prescribed
areas, the merits of his claim to refugee status will not be considered.
9 3
The place of origin requirement thus severely limits the number of refugees
who can take advantage of section 203(a)(7).
B. Flight
Once establishing geographic eligibility, the applicant must then show
that his departure from one of the above areas constituted a flight caused
by persecution or fear of persecution on account of race, religion, or
political opinion. Of course, a clandestine and hazardous departure by
whether such a distinction between people who left the same country for the same
reasons can be justified on any ground except the long standing dichotomy between
the two hemispheres which exists in United States immigration law.
9 Matter of Patel, 13 I. & N. Dec. 113 (1968) (Kenya).
90 This redundant language is derived from earlier legislation; apparently it was used to
distinguish between the Soviet Union and its satellites. It may have been felt that the
use of the term "Communist-dominated" implied a more transitory status.
91 In a proceeding under Sec. 243(h), the alien alleged that a Communist form of govern-
ment was then in power in Chile. Since the political coloration of a regime is not a
preliminary requirement for establishing eligibility for relief under Sec. 243(h), the
Board did not pass on the validity of this assertion and decided the case on other
grounds. Matter of Bohmwald, I.D. # 2219 (1973).
92 See Shen v. Esperdy, 428 F.2d 293 (2d Cir. 1970) and Matter of Sun, 12 I. & N. Dec.
36 (1966). In both cases the applicants fled from the Chinese mainland to Taiwan.
The question of whether they met the statutory requirement of flight from a Communist
country or area was not raised even though it was the position of both Chinese govern-
ments and the United States that Taiwan was an integral part of China. Such a viev
would appear to be applicable to other cases of intra-national flight in similarly divided
countries. The ambiguous legal status of persons from one zone in the other, however,
makes refugees of this type peculiarly susceptible to being considered resettled. For
this reason both Shen's and Sun's applications were denied. An interesting feature of
these cases is that they appear to give recognition to the concept of anticipatory flight.
Shen left the mainland in 1948 and Sun left in May 1949. Since the area from which
they fled was not Communist-dominated at the time of their departure but became so
only after they left, technically they would appear not to have met the requirement of
Sec. 203(a)(7). In light of the broad interpretation which flight has been given, however,
such a view would be erroneous.
93 Matter of Patel, 13 I. & N. Dec. 113 (1968).
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the alien from his homeland will not in itself establish persecution,
however, combined with other factors it may support his claim. On the
other hand, there is a recognition that a legal and open departure may
constitute a flight from persecution if additional elements are present.
94
As the Board of Immigration Appeals stated in a case arising under sec-
tion 243(h): eligibility is not restricted to "persons who climbed under
fences or swam rivers at night."95 This reasoning would appear to be
applicable to cases involving section 203(a)(7).
The length of time which elapses between an alien's lawful departure
and his claim of refugee status is one factor to be considered. In Matter
of Adamska,98 the applicant legally left Poland and entered the United
States as a visitor for pleasure. Within one month after arrival she dem-
onstrated by several actions her intention of not returning. This, to-
gether with .a. showing of past persecution at home, was held to constitute
a flight establishing eligibility under section 203(a)(7). In Matter of
Frisch,97 the applicant had resided in the United States for five years
as a non-immigrant student before applying for refugee status during the
course of deportation proceedings. It was held that she had not estab-
lished flight at the time of her departure from her homeland and her ap-
plication was denied.
The length of time is, of course, not controlling, but serves only as
one indication of the person's intent at the time he left his country.
Closely related is his conduct and relationship with his government after
his legal departure, which may indicate at what point the intent to be-
come a refugee objectively manifested itself. In Adamska, the applicant
sent back her return ticket upon arrival and did not register with her em-
bassy as required. In the Frisch case, on the other hand, the applicant
continued to obtain extensions of her passport and re-entry visa long
after her arrival in the United States. Similar factors in other cases have
led to the applicants' failure to establish flight.98
The purpose of requiring the establishment of flight is aimed at the
question of whether intent to become a refugee existed at the time of de-
parture and was not formed after an exposure to the "good life" in the
United States. In certain situations, however, an alien can establish that
'4 This is particularly relevant when a refugee departs with the official consent of his
home government, difficult as that consent may be to secure. A current example of
this type of "legal" flight is the departure of Jews from the Soviet Union.
'5 Matter of Janus and Janek, 12 I. & N. Dec. 866, 876 (1968). This case involved three
aliens, two of whom were brothers. Both brothers applied for an adjustment of status
under Sec. 245. The application of one was granted, but that of the other denied. The
second brother and the third alien then petitioned for withholding of deportation under
See. 243(h). Although the case was decided on that issue, the opinion contains many
comments concerning Sec. 203(a)(7) and its relationship to Sec. 243(h).
96 12 1. & N. Dec. 201 (1967).
91 12 1. & N. Dec. 40 (1967).
98 Matter of Shirinian, 12 I. & N. Dec. 392 (1967) (repeated presentation of passport to
homeland's consular officials for revalidation); Matter of Lalian, 12 I. & N. Dec. 124
(1967) (obtaining three successive passports from home government while in the
United States).
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he constructively fled his homeland, even though he departed legally and
formed his intention to remain during his presence in this country. A
political change at home which would make it dangerous for the alien to
return has been held sufficient to establish such a flight for the purpose
of satisfying the statutory requirement.99 If, however, return to the home-
land becomes risky solely as a consequence of the alien's acts while in the
United States, constructive flight will not be established. 10  The concept
of constructive flight thus appears to be limited to those aliens who left
their homelands freely with the intention of returning and who face a risk
of persecution on their return as a result of external events not occas-
ioned by their own conduct.
The most crucial factor in establishing flight is a showing of perse-
cution. The mechanics of departure and subsequent conduct are at most
only peripheral points. It is interesting to note that in the cases where
the applicants have succeeded in establishing flight, even though their de-
parture may have been legal and the intent to remain away had been
formed later, they also succeeded in showing that they had been perse-
cuted or would face persecution upon their return. Whereas in those in-
stances where flight was not established, the applicants had also failed to
show either past persecution or its future likelihood. 10'
Two cases with similar factual settings are illustrative of the impor-
tance of persecution in establishing flight. In Matter of Zedkova,10 2
the applicant had entered the United States as a visitor for pleasure in-
tending to return to Czechoslovakia. During her absence, her country
was invaded by the Soviet Union. She chose to remain abroad disobey-
ing an order from her embassy to return. The Board felt that in light of
the circumstances prevailing in Czechoslovakia and her own allegations,
she had made a sufficient showing of the likelihood of persecution upon
her return. It was felt that it would be inequitable to draw a distinc-
tion between those who fled their country and those who later chose to
remain outside of it for the same reasons. In Shubash v. District Direc-
99 Matter of Zedkova, 13 I. & N. Dec. 626 (1970) (Soviet invasion and occupation of
Czechoslovakia).
100 In Matter of Taheri, I.D. # 2124 (1972), the applicant had engaged in violent
demonstrations against his government's consulate and had been convicted of false
imprisonment and resisting arrest by United States courts. He claimed that he would
be persecuted for political reasons if he went home and attempted to show that he had
constructively fled from his country so as to qualify under Sec. 203(a)(7). The Board
found that there had been no political change in his homeland and that any danger he
might face upon his return would be as a consequence of his own actions in the United
States. In other situations, however, the risks which an alien may face upon his return
as a result of his conduct while here may be helpful factors in determining eligibility
under Sec. 203(a)(7). See Matter of Kukla, I.D. # 2284 (1974), where the alien's
cooperation with United States government agencies during his stay here as an exchange
visitor rendered his claim of anticipated persecution more credible. In this case, though,
the applicant was not attempting to establish constructive flight.
101 In Matter of Taheri, I.D. # 2124 (1972), the applicant was not permitted to show the
future likelihood of any persecution because he had failed to establish that he had
constructively fled his country.
102 13 I. & N. Dec. 626 (1970).
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tor, 13 the applicant was an Arab Christian who was in the United States
as a non-immigrant visitor at the time his home in Jerusalem became oc-
cupied by Israel. The applicant apparently made no other allegations in
support of his claim, other than his religion and nationality. The court
denied his application for refugee status, holding that "Shubash [had]
not proved that he would be persecuted or hampered in any way if he re-
turned."104
Thus, on the basis of the reported cases, it appears that if an appli-
cant has left his homeland illegally, at least the technical requirement of
flight will be satisfied and further inquiry will be made into his motives
to ascertain whether such a flight was due to persecution or fear of perse-
cution. In some situations, flight will be interpreted as encompassing
not only legal departure, but even a departure with intent to return, if
the applicant establishes either past persecution or its future likelihood.
Absent a showing of persecution, even the most perilous and dramatic
flight will be irrelevant in determining eligibility.
C. Persecution
The term persecution appears in varying contexts both in prior stat-
utes and in current immigration law; 0 5 it is the chief element in estab-
lishing an alien's status as a refugee. Unfortunately, its definition lacks
more definitive guidelines, other than that it must occur on account of
race, religion, or political opinion. Since amendment in 1965, the word-
ing of section 243(h) has been similar to section 203(a)(7) and a number
of cases decided thereunder have attempted to delineate the elements of
persecution.10 6 The applicants under these sections, however, are not "in
the same legal posture,"'0 7 creating basic distinctions which preclude
analysis of one section based on cases arising under the other. The pur-
poses of the two sections are entirely different; section 203(a)(7) extends
a preference in being able to achieve immigrant status, whereas section
243(h) only withholds deportation without granting such status. A denial
of a section 203(a) (7) application does not deprive the alien of an oppor-
tunity to become an immigrant in some other way, 08 but merely denies
him a preferential position. On the other hand, a denial of relief under
section 243(h) may entail tragic and irreversible consequences. It is
conceivable that future developments may lead to a more liberal construc-
103 450 F.2d 345 (9th Cir. 1971).
104 Id. at 346.
105 See note 84 supra.
106 For an extensive discussion of Sec. 243(h) and cases arising under it, see Evans, supra
note 5, at 225-48. See also Evans, Political Refugees and the United States Immigra-
tion Laws: Further Developments, 66 AM. J. IN'L L. 571 (1972).
107 Matter of Janus and Janek, 12 I. & N. Dec. 866, 876 (1968).
10 Although the applicant met all the requirements of Sec. 203(a)(7), his application for
an adjustment of status under its proviso was denied because he lacked two years of
physical presence in the United States. He was found, however, to be eligible for a
sixth preference immigrant visa and thus an adjustment of status was granted. Matter
of Kukla, I.D. # 2284 (1974).
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tion of persecution under section 243(h), whereas a growing number of
applicants who otherwise qualify under section 203(a)(7) may lead to a
more restrictive interpretation. Moreover, the denial of an application
under the proviso to section 203(a)(7) of an alien already in the United
States is without prejudice to any claim he may raise under section
243(h). 109 It is possible that different results may be reached on the
same set of facts depending on which section is invoked. This occurred
in Matter of Adamska, 10 where the applicant's petition under the old
and more stringent version of section 243(h)"' was denied, yet she suc-
ceeded under section 203(a)(7). Thus, only cases arising under the latter
section will be discussed in determining what constitutes persecution,
unless reference to a section 243(h) case is useful for clarification.
Generally, cases arising under section 203(a)(7) "must be decided
individually, on all of their facts."' 2 This is especially true in determin-
ing what constitutes persecution. Of the various elements discernible
from the cases no single one appears to be controlling, but taken together
and combined with such intangible factors as the sincerity of the appli-
cant's claim and the immigration officers' assessment of the situation in
his homeland, certain recurrent fact situations seem to support an allega-
tion of persecution. Of course, the existence of laws or governmental pol-
icies which are openly discriminatory against the alien's racial or religious
group would appear to create a prima facie case of persecution. In the
section of the Immigration and Nationality Act which exempts persons
fleeing. religious persecution from the literacy requirement, it is provided
that such persecution may be evidenced "by overt acts or by laws or gov-
ernmental regulations that discriminate against such alien or any group to
which he belongs because of his religious faith." 113 By analogy, perse-
cution on grounds of race could be evidenced in the same manner. In
this era of image-consciousness, however, even the most repressive re-
gimes usually shy away from enacting flagrantly discriminatory laws or
regulations, leaving establishment of persecution on these grounds to cir-
cumstances of individual fact situations. The applicant's record of polit-
ical activity and actions directed against him for obviously political rea-
sons would also clearly establish persecution. The applicants under
section 203(a)(7) have usually been politically inactive, however, and the
alleged persecution has taken the form of generally applicable criminal
sanctions, economic reprisals, or other vaguely defined actions.
It appears that the activity which is directed against the alien must at
least emanate from official or quasi-governmental sources. Allegations
'0 Matter of Taheri, I.D. # 2124 (1972).
110 12 I. & N. Dec. 201 (1967).
' Prior to its amendment by the Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Sec. 243(h) required the alien to
establish the likelihood of "physical persecution." For a discussion of the change
effected by the amendment, see Evans, supra note 5, at 225-48. See also Evans,
Political Refugees and the United States Immigration Laws: Further Developments,
66 AM. J. INT'L L. 571 (1972).
112 Matter of Janus and Janek, 12 1. & N. Dec. 866, 876 (1968).
13 Sec. 212(b)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(b)(2) (1970).
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that the applicant was ridiculed for his religious beliefs or practices by
private individuals are insufficient to support a claim of persecution."
4
Membership in a minority group is not in itself sufficient," 5 however,
actions or policies directed against the group to which the applicant be-
longs may support his claim. In an unreported decision dealing with a
Palestinian's claim of refugee status, it was held that
[t]he persistent action of the Israelis in controlling activities of
Palestinian Arabs has placed the applicant in a position where
he would be subject to social and economic restrictions and
hardship if he returned to the Gaza Strip. The predicament in
which he would find himself amounts to persecution.' 16
But if the applicant does not belong to an identifiable group subjected to
such restrictions, the persecution must be directed against him personally.
Allegations that relatives have been persecuted in the past is not suffi-
cient." 7 The fact that family members have not been persecuted as a
result of the applicant's actions would in contrast seem to undermine his
claim." 8  The general situation in the alien's homeland in itself does not
appear to be sufficient," 9 although in conjunction with other facts it may
support the applicant's claim. 20 Furthermore, difficulty in obtaining em-
ployment or a lack of economic opportunity unconnected with other fac-
"4 Matter of Ugricic, I.D. # 2211 (1972); Matter of Frisch, 12 I. & N. Dec. 40 (1967).
"5 Shubash v. District Director, 450 F.2d 345 (9th Cir. 1971) (Christian Arab in area under
Israeli control); Matter of Shirinian, 12 I. & N. Dec. 392 (1967) (Armenian in Egypt);
Matter of Lalian, 12 I. & N. Dec. 124 (1967) (Christian in Moslem country).
16 Unreported Decision #A17 648 866 (1973) (Regional Commissioner reversing District
Director's denial of refugee classification) [hereinafter cited as U.D.]. The unreported
decisions cited herein represent cases arising in the Cleveland area which have been
decided by the District Director and certified by the Regional Commissioner in Rich-
mond, Virginia. Copies of the decisions are on file with the Cleveland office of the Im-
migration and Naturalization Service.
"1 Matter of Frisch, 12 I. & N. Dec. 40 (1967) (applicant's father imprisoned for crimes
against the state when she was a small child); U.D. # A19 590 791 (1973) (applicant's
parents, brother, and other relatives imprisoned for political reasons prior to 1960 and
the family temporarily removed from the area where they lived. "The applicant
himself was young at the time, and except for losing a year of school when the family
was transported, he did not suffer directly."). But see Matter of Zedkova, 13 I. & N.
Dec. 626, 627 (1970) (past persecution was directed against the applicant's father but
not at her). Here, however, the applicant was not trying to show that she had fled
because of past persecution but that she would face persecution upon her return. Past
persecution of her father together with her disobedience of an official order to return
and the general situation in her homeland were held to have established that likelihood.
"s Matter of Taheri, I.D. # 2124 (1972) ("No allegations have been made that the
applicant or his parents have been persecuted at any time .... "); Matter of Shirinian,
12 I. & N. Dec. 392, 395 (1967) (applicant's husband "has been allowed to continue his
business . . . even to the extent of performing secret work for the government.").
19 Matter of Shirinian, 12 I. & N. Dec. 392 (1967) (persecution of Christians and Jews in
Egypt); Matter of Frisch, 12 I. & N. Dec. 40 (1967) (general political situation in
Yugoslavia).
120 Matter of Zedkova, 13 I. & N. Dec. 626 (1970) (Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia);
Matter of Adamska, 12 I. & N. Dec. 201, 205 (1967) (a more repressive political at-
mosphere in Poland).
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tors is not considered evidence of persecution. 2 ' If, however, such eco-
nomic deprivation occurs for political reasons, it may support a claim of
persecution. In Yee Chien Woo v. Rosenberg,2 2 the alien's business
had been confiscated by the Communist regime in China and thus he en-
tered Hong Kong penniless. The Immigration and Naturalization Ser-
ice rejected his claim to refugee status arguing that he had left China
for economic reasons. The district court found, however, that such a con-
tention ignored the realities of Communist ideology. "Both capitalist and
anticommunist are enemies of the state,' ' 23 and as a former capitalist,
the alien had good reason to fear persecution.
The former political activity of the alien and his awareness of the rea-
sons for his departure are important elements in evaluating the merits of
his claim. In Matter of Ugricic, 24 the applicant was an eighteen-year-
old laborer and farm worker with eight years of education. In his appli-
cation he stated that he did not like the political system of Yugoslavia
and wished to emigrate to a democratic country. In the course of his
interview by an immigration officer, it was shown that "he had little or
no knowledge of the workings of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia or
what it advocates, nor of the political, economic or other operations of the
Government of Yugoslavia.' ' 2 5 It is questionable whether any person of
similar background in any country would be able to offer an adequate
explanation of his nation's political system. It is dubious whether this
case suggests that to qualify, all applicants for refugee status have to pass
some type of political science examination. It is probable that in view of
the ease with which Yugoslavs may leave their country and the consid-
erable amount of economically motivated emigration, such an inquiry into
the applicant's political awareness is properly used to screen out bona
fide refugees from those leaving for other reasons.
Although an applicant's lack of past political activity is one factor
which may undermine his claim,' 26 this factor does not appear to be
121 Matter of Lalian, 12 I. & N. Dec. 124, 125 (1967) ("indignities" forced applicant's
husband to sell his business); U.D. # A17 633 904 (1973) ("nearly impossible to regain
employment" if applicant returned to her country); U.D. # A19 590 791 (1973) ("ap-
plicant does not expect that he could obtain suitable employment if he returns .... ").
122 295 F. Supp. 1370 (S.D. Cal. 1968), aff'd, 419 F.2d 252 (9th Cir. 1969), rev'd and
remanded, 402 U.S. 49, rev'd, 445 F.2d 277 (1971). This case was ultimately decided
on the issue of whether the applicant had become firmly resettled in Hong Kong so as to
disqualify him from refugee status; the district court's initial finding of persecution was
never challenged.
123 Yee Chien Woo v. Rosenberg, 295 F. Supp. 1370, 1371 (S.D. Cal. 1968).
124 I.D. # 2211 (1972). This is perhaps the only reported case involving an applicant for
a conditional entry from outside the United States, rather than an adjustment of status
under the proviso to Sec. 203(a)(7). It is interesting to note that the Italian government
refused to consider Ugricic as a political refugee when he entered that country. This
suggests that a determination by a foreign government is not conclusive and that each
application will be decided on its own merits by United States authorities.
125 Id.
128 U.D. # A19 590 791 (1973). This appears, however, to have been merely an incidental
factor since the sincerity of the applicant's motives was questionable. The alien had
married a United States resident while here as a visitor. They were later separated and
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significant, especially in view of the dire consequences such activity
may create in certain countries. In a case arising under section 243(h),
the Board has stated that a person who has not expressed opposition to
the political regime of his nation is not automatically excluded from re-
lief, and this view would also appear to be justifiable under section
203(a)(7).127  As with the other factors previously discussed, political
inactivity is merely another fact, though not conclusive in itself, which
is used in combination with others to determine the merits of the appli-
cant's assertion.
A claim frequently raised is that the alien would be subjected to im-
prisonment or other punishment upon his return for violation of travel
restrictions or staying abroad longer than permitted, and that such pun-
ishment is tantamount to persecution. 28  The Board has held that gener-
ally "[s]uch imprisonment may not be considered on account of race,
religion, or political opinion, but rather is a criminal sanction that is rec-
oncilable with generally recognized concepts of justice."'129 In a case
arising under section 243(h), however, the Board recognized that not
every statute "imposing criminal sanctions for unauthorized travel outside
a particular country must be devoid of political implications. That will
depend upon the provisions of the particular statute and the manner in
which it is administered."' 3 0  Any possible punishment the alien may
face upon his return is therefore just one more element to be considered.
D. Inability or Unwillingness to Return
Once an applicant has established that he has fled from the appropriate
area because of persecution as required by section 203(a)(7)(A)(i), he
must also show that he is "unable or unwilling to return" as prescribed
in (ii). 13  The statutory conditions of having fled and being "unable or
unwilling" to return are in the conjunctive; both must be met. 32  This
requirement, however, is less formidable than would at first appear.
"The alien is not required to substantiate that he would in fact be sub-
jected to persecution if he returned there."'3 In effect this interpreta-
his wife withdrew a petition for his immigrant visa. It was at this point, some three
years after his arrival, that the applicant sought classification as a refugee in an effort
to remain in the United States.
127 See Matter of Janus and Janek, 12 I. & N. Dec. 866, 876 (1968).
121 See U.D. # A19 590 791 (1973); Matter of Zedkova, 13 1. & N. Dec. 626 (1970);
Matter of Shirinian, 12 I. & N. Dec. 392 (1967).
129 Matter of Shirinian, 12 I. & N. Dec. 392 (1967) (citing numerous cases).
130 Matter of Janus and Janek, 12 I. & N. Dec. 866, 873 (1968).
"I' Sec. 203(a)(7)(A)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(7)(A)(ii) (1970).
132 Shubash v. District Director, 450 F.2d 345, 346 (9th Cir. 1971).
133 Matter of Moy, 12 1. & N. Dec. 121, 123 (1967); accord, Matter of Frisch, 12 I. & N.
Dec. 40, 42 (1967). Where, however, the applicant did not originally flee because of
persecution but wishes to remain in the United States because of a changed political
atmosphere at home, the likelihood of future persecution must be substantiated. See
Shubash v. District Director, 450 F.2d 345 (9th Cir. 1971); Matter of Zedkova, 13
I. & N. Dec. 626 (1970).
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tion creates a purely subjective test in which the alien's assertion can only
be questioned if unreasonable.1 34  To date there have been no reported
cases in which an alien has established eligibility under (i) and yet failed
to do so under (ii). The weight given the applicant's subjective opinion
under this clause represents a great contrast with the requirement for
establishing constructive flight where future likelihood of persecution
must be proved.
E. The Requirement of Not Being Firmly Resettled
Unlike earlier enactments, section 203(a)(7) does not require that the
applicant show that he has not become firmly resettled in some other
area before becoming eligible to claim refugee status. 35 It has been held
that the applicant's status in an intervening country is not a relevant fac-
tor in determining eligibility, 36 however, the opposite conclusion has
been reached on essentially the same facts. 137 This conflict was resolved
by the Supreme Court in Rosenberg v. Yee Chien Woo; 3 8 in a 5-4
decision the majority held valid the requirement of not being firmly
resettled despite its absence from the statute. In a footnote, however,
the majority pointed out that such a condition did not exclude a refugee
who had made his flight in successive stages. 39 The operative factor ap-
pears to be what the alien's status in the intervening countries was at
the various junctures.
The effect of Rosenberg has been to firmly re-establish this require-
ment. 40  Resettlement is determined by the alien's legal status in the
intervening country, 4 ' and indicative of this may be the exercise of any
rights and privileges in that country which are inconsistent with refugee
134 This could occur only in those situations where there has been such a drastic change in
his homeland since his flight that refusal to return would be patently unreasonable.
For example, in a case arising under Sec. 243(h) where the alien alleged threatened
persecution by the regime then in power in Chile if she were deported, a change of
government took place while the case was pending which made her claim patently
without merit. Matter of Mladineo, I.D. # 2264 (1974).
'35 The only reference to such a possible requirement occurs in Sec. 203(g) which provides
for a subsequent adjustment of status by conditional entrants. In addition to the other
prerequisites prescribed therein, the alien must not have acquired permanent residence.
136 Yee Chien Woo v. Rosenberg, 419 F.2d 252 (9th Cir. 1969).
137 Shen v. Esperdy, 428 F.2d 293 (2d Cir. 1970).
13s 402 U.S. 49 (1971), noted in 7 TEXAS INT'L L.J. 291 (1972). For an extensive analysis of
the Supreme Court's opinion and a discussion of this issue in general, see Evans, Political
Refugees "Not Firmly Resettled" as in Section 2 03 (a)(7 ) of the Immigration and Na-
tionality Act of 1952 as Amended, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 101 (1972).
139 Rosenberg v. Yee Chien Woo, 402 U.S. 49, 57 n.6 (1971).
140 It had never in fact actually been abandoned, as the court pointed out in Shen v.
Esperdy, 428 F.2d 293 (2d Cir. 1970). The Immigration and Naturalization Service had
always imposed this requirement despite its absence from the statute. See Evans,
supra note 138, for the criteria.
141 Such a change of status may occur even without the alien's wish. A Chinese refugee
who had entered Hong Kong illegally was held to have become permanently resettled
when a subsequent ordinance conferred permanent resident status on all illegal aliens
who had been in the city for seven years. Matter of Kwan, I.D. # 2247 (1973).
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status. 142  The duration of stay is not, in itself, controlling. Rather,
"[i]t is .. . left to the discretion of the Immigration Service to deter-
mine what amount of time of intervening residence in a third country
is sufficient to terminate the applicant's flight."' 4  Where an alien had
been in Colombia for only two years but had acquired business interests
in that locale, there was deemed to have been a resettlement. 144 In con-
trast, a Palestinian Arab who had left his refugee camp and worked in
Qatar for seven years before coming to the United States, was not even
confronted with the issue of resettlement.
45
Moreover, the resettlement of a minor applicant's parents may be im-
puted to him after coming of age; 46 and the converse may also be true.
A married applicant born in Hong Kong of refugee parents was eligible
even though she was a British subject. An important consideration in this
case may have been her inability to join her husband in Canada and the
presence of her immediate family in the United States as parolees.1
47
The requirement that the alien not be firmly resettled operates as an-
other limiting device on the number of persons who can utilize section
203(a)(7). It appears that Chinese refugees are most susceptible to this
requirement, which can perhaps be explained by the fact that many Chi-
nese have been present for long periods of time in areas of first refuge
such as Hong Kong and Taiwan. Under the restrictive features of prior
refugee enactments and the national origin quota system which existed
until 1965, very few Chinese were able to enter the United States, re-
sulting in a build up of a large body of eligible applicants. Interestingly,
in these cases there usually appears to be little inquiry into the validity
of their claims that they have fled because of persecution. Perhaps the
nature of the regime on mainland China makes such inquiry impolitic. 48
The requirement of not being firmly resettled operates, in that event, as
a screening device, much like the persecution requirement, to separate
bona fide political refugees from those merely seeking to enter the United
States for economic and personal motives.
142 See Alidede v. Hurney, 301 F. Supp. 1031 (N.D. II. 1969) (citizenship, ownership of a
restaurant); Matter of Moy, 12 I. & N. Dec. 117 (1967) (ownership of real property and
a bank account); Matter of Sun, 12 I. & N. Dec. 36 (1966) (governmental employment
and military service).
143 Chi-Wai Lui v. Pilliod, 358 F. Supp. 542, 544 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
144 Matter of Moy, 12 I. & N. Dec. 117 (1967).
145 U.D. # A17 648 866 (1973).
146 Matter of Ng, 12 I. & N. Dec. 411 (1967).
147 Matter of Hung, 12 I. & N. Dec. 178 (1967).
14 It is interesting to note that there are no reported cases involving Soviet nationals
although 1,670 of them have been admitted to permanent residence in the United States
under the provisions of Sec. 203(a)(7). Table 6E, 1974 INS ANN. REP. 35. This may
suggest that the depth and scope of inquiry into an applicant's motives and the quantum
of proof required may be partially governed by the general impression of the political
situation in the alien's homeland.
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F. Summary
No further requirements may be imposed on an alien who seeks to
qualify under section 203(a)(7), although there have been attempts to
do so. In Shubash v. District Director,149 the court suggested that the
alien's ability to return to an area other than the one from which he
actually or constructively fled is a relevant factor. 150  In Matter of
Moy, 15' the application of a Chinese for classification as a refugee was
denied for failure to prove that he would be subjected to persecution if
he returned to Hong Kong or proceeded to Taiwan. This view, however,
appears to be at variance with the Board. In reversing the District
Director's determination, the Board stated that "[t]he ability of the appli-
cant to proceed to some other country is of no consequence, provided
he has not firmly resettled in such country .... ."152 It was held in
another case involving a Spanish citizen who had been residing in Cuba
that "[t]he ability of the applicant to return to the country of her birth
and/or nationality, or to some other foreign country is of no consequence
provided . . . the alien fits the statutory description of a refugee set
forth in section 203(a)(7) .... 13
This interpretation may seem unfair since it places the refugee who
has nowhere else to go on the same footing with one who could easily
return to the country of his nationality. In some instances, however, the
ties to the original country are remote in time and the alien may have
valid political objections to returning. There is also no assurance that he
would be accepted if he did return. This interpretation thus obviates the
necessity for the alien to prove both that he meets the eligibility require-
ments of the statute in all respects, and that he cannot or will not go
elsewhere for equally valid reasons.
The purpose of all section 203(a)(7) requirements is to limit the num-
ber of aliens who can utilize this provision. Although most of the re-
quirements may be justified as restricting the section's benefits to bona
fide political refugees, the limitation to persons from Communist areas
and the Middle East does not logically seem to serve such a purpose.
It is untenable that the possibility of persecution on account of one's race,
religion, or political opinion can be circumscribed to one geographical
region or to one ideology. Nonetheless, this is the precise effect of
current law. If an alien can bring himself within the categories defined
by section 203(a)(7), even the most spurious claim will receive consid-
eration, 154 whereas, a good faith claim of persecution will not be heard if
149 450 F.2d 345 (9th Cir. 1971).
150 The court found not only that appellee Shubash had failed to prove the likelihood of
any persecution if he returned to Israeli-occupied Jerusalem, but also that he had failed
to prove he would be persecuted if he went to unoccupied Jordan. Id. at 346.
151 12 I. & N. Dec. 121 (1967).
152 Id. at 123.
11 Matter of Rodriguez, 11 1. & N. Dec. 901, 902 (1966).
154 In U.D. # A17 633 904 (1973), the applicant had come to the United States to marry a
friend of her uncle. After the marriage plan fell through she overstayed her visitor's
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the nation from which the alien has fled is not within these arbitrary
guidelines. 155  Although the results often engendered by such provisions
may seem inequitable, they are nonetheless necessitated by the practical
impossibility of making the United States a haven for all the worlds' ill-
begotten children.
IV. CONCLUSION
The utility and effectiveness of the present system of refugee immi-
gration under section 203(a)(7) is considerably limited in emergency
situations. The needed flexibility to cope with such problems is provided
by the parole provision of section 212(d)(5). The use of parole by the
executive branch, however, was not intended by Congress as a surrender-
ing of control over immigration policy. 156  This has created an anomo-
lous situatioh in which aliens are subject to two separate provisions
which often lead to diametrically opposite results.
Whereas the system under section 203(a)(7) employs carefully pre-
scribed requirements and numerical ceilings based on our ability to ab-
sorb large numbers of immigrants, executive extension of parole is based
entirely on political considerations devoid of personal or economic fac-
tors. 57  Certain shortcomings inherent in the congressional approach
permit it to be used by only small numbers of those meeting the require-
visa and was found to be deportable. As one of her reasons for claiming refugee status,
she stated that she would be subject to ridicule and disgrace if she returned to her native
village without having been married. In U.D. # A19 595 573 (1973), the applicant
was a West German citizen born in Yugoslavia who had dual nationality, and who
entered the United States on a non-immigrant visa issued in Germany. After three and
one-half years in this country she applied for classification as a refugee offering no
evidence to support her claim. On the basis of these and similar cases, it appears that
in situations where the alien is fortunate enough to establish his origin in an area
covered by Sec. 203(a)(7), an application for refugee status is resorted to when all other
avenues of remaining in the United States fail.
155 Matter of Patel, 13 I. & N. Dec. 113 (1968). Whether the applicant's claim had any
merit is not known; because her native country, Kenya, was not Communist nor within
"the general area of the Middle East," the Board concluded that "no purpose would be
served in considering whether the applicant fled from Kenya because of persecution
• . . within the meaning of Sec. 203(a)(7). Id. at 115. This is not to suggest that
bona fide political refugees from other areas are without any remedy under United
States immigration law. Sec. 243(h) imposes no geographic or political limits and may
be invoked by any alien who is within the United States. Asylum and parole may be
granted on an individual basis in appropriate cases.
' In the House and Senate committee reports accompanying the bill which contained
Sec. 203(a)(7), it is stated: "The Congress, charged with the constitutional responsibility
for the regulation of immigration, reserves the power to review the case history of
every refugee conditionally entered into the United States to determine whether the
interests of this country are subject to outside pressures." H.R. REP. No. 745, 89th
Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1965); S. REP. No. 748, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3334 (1965).
Sec. 203(f), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(f) (1970), requires the Attorney General to submit to Con-
gress a "complete and detailed statement of facts in the case of each alien who condi-
tionally entered" under Sec. 203(a)(7).
'57 Matter of Janus and Janek, 12 I. & N. Dec. 866 (1968); Evans, supra note 5, at
583-84.
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ments. Hence, the need to assimilate large numbers in certain situations
has compelled Congress to acquiesce in the continued use of parole.1
5 8
Curtailment of the Executive's use of parole and placing refugee im-
migration solely under congressional control may not be a viable alter-
native. Congress' record in this area in the past has not been entirely
laudatory. During the 1930's as the threat of totalitarianism and po-
tential genocide became increasingly apparent, legislators resisted all ef-
forts toward even minor liberalizations in the immigration law which
might have saved many lives. 5 9 Attempts to deal with refugee situations
on an ad hoc basis during the period between 1948 and 1965 were
blemished at times by displays of ethnic favoritism160 and by bureaucratic
delays.1 6 1  For Cubans and South Vietnamese the United States has be-
come an area of first refuge, making prolonged debate a luxury they
certainly can ill afford.
Perhaps the best solution would be to create new statutory authority
combining flexibility and executive discretion within clearly stated limita-
tions prescribed by Congress. Before a comprehensive effort to establish
new refugee immigration policy can be essayed, however, it will be neces-
sary to determine what the underlying purpose of such a policy should
be. In the past most refugees have been members of ethnic groups repre-
senting a significantly large community already present in the United
158 This acquiescence has taken the form of an approval by the appropriate congressional
committees of the Executive's decision to invoke Sec. 212(d)(5) on behalf of a particular
group. C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE 119 (1974
Supp.). In the recent decision to parole up to 130,000 South Vietnamese refugees,
the approval came from the Senate Judiciary Committee. N.Y. Times, Apr. 23, 1975,
at 1, col. 6 (city ed.). Congress as a whole has ratified such decisions at a later time.
In the case of the Hungarians and Cubans this ratification took the form of special
legislation to permit them to adjust their status to that of permanent residents. Act of
July 25, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-559, 72 Stat. 419, and Act of Nov. 2, 1966, Pub. L. No.
89-732, 80 Stat. 1161. Under the present version of Sec. 245, such special legislation is
no longer necessary at least for natives of the Eastern Hemisphere. Because there is
an annual limit of 20,000 on the number of immigrant visas which can be issued to
natives of any one Eastern Hemisphere country, and because a parolee's adjustment of
status is not retroactive to the date of his arrival in the United States, it appears,
however, that some special legislation may be necessary to permit South Vietnamese
parolees to acquire permanent residence and to become eligible for U.S. citizenship
within a reasonable time.
'1 R. DIVINE, AMERICAN IMMIGRATION PoLcY, 1924-1952, at 93-94 (1957).
160 For example, the 1950 Amendment to the Displaced Persons Act of 1948 limited
eligibility to "persons of European national origin .... " Displaced Persons Act of
1948, ch. 647, 62 Stat. 1009, as amended, ch. 262, § 4, 64 Stat. 219, 221 (1950)
(adding § 3(c)). The Refugee Relief Act of 1953 allocated 132,000 immigrant visas to
German, Italian, and Dutch refugees but only 5,000 to Chinese and other Asians. The
Refugee Relief Act of 1953, ch. 336, § 4(a)(1), (5), (6), (9), (10), (12), (13), 67 Stat.
400, 401-02.
161 The Presidential Directive of Dec. 22, 1945, took cognizance of the magnitude of the
post-war refugee problem in Europe, but the bill which became the Displaced Persons
Act of 1948 was not introduced until April 1, 1947, and the measure itself was not
enacted until June 25, 1948. R. DIVINE, supra note 167, at 128. The amendment which
liberalized that Act and enabled many persons to utilize it was not passed until June 16,
1950. More recently the measure which permitted Cuban parolees to adjust their
status was not enacted until Nov. 2, 1966, more than five years after large numbers of
Cubans began to be paroled into the United States.
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States.1 62  Their acceptance was prompted by foreign policy and hu-
manitarian considerations which enjoyed domestic political support.
There is growing evidence, however, that in the future these three moti-
vating factors may diverge. The most compelling humanitarian situations
may arise in areas where American foreign policy interests are marginal
and are in reference to ethnic groups having insubstantial domestic sup-
port. On the other hand, refugee situations can arise in areas where
there may be substantial support for their resolution among large groups
of Americans, but where any involvement would run counter to United
States foreign policy. 6 3 The recent decision to accept South Vietna-
mese refugees appears to have been prompted by foreign policy and hu-
manitarian considerations, but it is questionable whether there is signifi-
cant public or political support. A single motive cannot be articulated as
a basis for preferred treatment of refugees, and none will be attempted
here. This must be the starting point, however, in any move toward
changing existing law.
NicHmOAs B. KAP
16 Based on their country of birth, the largest groups have come from Cuba, Poland,
Germany, Yugoslavia, Hungary, and Italy, in that order. Of the 1,030,193 refugees
admitted between 1945 and 1974, 749,703 have come from Europe. Table 6E, 1974
INS ANN. REP. 35. Even some of the refugees born in Asian countries have been per-
sons of European ethnic origin.
1'3 A current example is Northern Ireland. The proposed Northern Irish Relief Act of
1973, which was introduced in the 93d Congress and is now pending in the 94th Congress,
would admit up to 25,000 persons who are seeking "to avoid the consequences of war,
armed conflict, or civil disorder, or persecution .... ." Northern Irish Relief Act of
1973, § 3, H.R. 2789 and H.R. 4195, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); H.R. 220, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1975). While such a measure might enjoy considerable political support
among the American people, it could prove diplomatically embarrassing to admit
refugees from persecution by a government which is a close ally. In the case of those
applicants who had been convicted of various crimes by British authorities, it would be
necessary to determine whether such convictions were for political offenses, so as to
avoid the general prohibition against immigrants with criminal records. This, too,
might prove to be an embarrassing inquiry.
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